Who is the  Crown ? ---------------------------------------------------------------  1
The importance of full, fair and timely disclosure is well established in law. --  1
Direct indictment. ------------------------------------------------------------------  2
Supreme Court's disgust with prosecutors, Stinchcombe. ---------------------  2
Should Mr. Madigan be allowed to keep his head in the sand? ----------------  3
Faults swearing of information by the police. -----------------------------------  4
Unethical, immoral, malicious prosecution. -------------------------------------  4
Canadian Criminal Code, Charter of Rights, Bar Ass. ------------------------  5
Legal Profession Act --------------------------------------------------------------  7
Continuing Cases -------------------------------------------------------------------  8
Directives from Attorney General for full disclosure. ---------------------------  9
Summary of evidence -------------------------------------------------------------  11
Evidence in detail ------------------------------------------------------------------  11
Defence did not ask for specific items ---------------------------------------  11
Wire tape ( Dawn ) -------------------------------------------------------------  11
Physical evidence ---------------------------------------------------------------  11
Hair & clothing -------------------------------------------------------------------  13
3.5 c hole -------------------------------------------------------------------------  14
Jackson one murderer ----------------------------------------------------------  14
RCMP officers ------------------------------------------------------------------  15
Carport exhibit ------------------------------------------------------------------  15
Cst Black -----------------------------------------------------------------------  15
Phone call ----------------------------------------------------------------------  16
Real estate and ferry witnesses -----------------------------------------------  17
Video or tape record interviews ----------------------------------------------  17
Considine undertaking ---------------------------------------------------------  18
Police lies ( id's ) -------------------------------------------------------------  18
Charles Smith ------------------------------------------------------------------  19
Prosecutor's deliberate deceit -----------------------------------------------  20
Donald Marshall Jr. Case ------------------------------------------------------  20
Not precedence --------------------------------------------------------------------  23
Benchers ability and responsibility ---------------------------------------------  23
  R. v. Caccamo (1975), 21 C.C.C. (2d) 257, D.L.R. (3d) 685, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 786,

Justice Spence with Justice Laskin concurring at page 265:

"In my view, it is the duty of the Court to be vigilant to assure itself that the appellant has had a fair trial and if the regrettable conduct of the prosecution, using that term to cover both the police and Crown counsel, ever results in unfairness then the Court should act with decisiveness to reverse such unfairness."

R. v. Jack (January 1992), 70 C.C.C. (3d) 67,

"There can now be no doubt that there exists a duty on the part of the Crown in a criminal case involving an indictable offence to make full, fair and timely disclosure of all relevant facts. For these purposes, the Crown includes the police."

R. v. Harris [1927], 2K.B. 587,

"…that in a criminal trial where the liberty of a subject is at stake, the sole object of the proceedings is to make certain that justice should be done between the subject and the state, is firmly established."

Lemay v. The King (1951) 102 C.C.C. 1,

"I wish to make it perfectly clear that I do not intend to say anything which might be regarded as lessening the duty which rests upon counsel for the Crown to bring forward evidence of every material fact known to the prosecution whether favourable to the accused or otherwise;"

R. v. C.(M.H.), (April 1991) 63 C.C.C. (3d) 385:

"This court has previously stated that the Crown is under a duty at Common law to disclose to the defence all material evidence whether favourable to the accused or not. In Lemay v. The King (1952), 102 C.C.C. 1 [1952] 1 S.C.R. 232, 14 C.R.89, while holding that a prosecutor had a discretion regarding which witnesses to call, it expressed the opinion that the Crown must nevertheless produce all material facts."

R. v. Jack supra

"Relevant information now includes statements obtained from persons by the authorities touching a matter in issue whether they are proposed as Crown witnesses or not."

Regina v. Arviv (1985), 19 C.C.C. (3d) 395,

"The preferring of a direct indictment under s. 507(3) of the Code in combination with the failure of the Crown to make adequate disclosure might, however, result in an accused being unable to make full answer and defence at his trial, thereby contravening s. 7 of the Charter and enabling the trial judge to fashion a remedy under s 24(1)."

Regina v. Ertel (1987), 35 C.C.C. (3d) 398,

"While the effect of a direct indictment may in some cases create several disadvantages, …. the Attorney-General, who is not impartial and does not hold a hearing, to commit people to trial, these disadvantages are not so unfair as to be discriminatory. In determining whether or not there has been discrimination it is proper to consider factors such as fairness, rationality and justifiability."

"The fundamental right to make full answer and defence is protected."

"In Arviv the court recognized two aspects of the direct indictment: the "charging" aspect and the "procedural" aspect. The procedural aspect of the direct indictment consists of the accused's deprival of the right to cross-examine the Crown witnesses at a preliminary inquiry. The conclusion reached was that the constitutional standard which a court must satisfy under s. 7 of the Charter is encompassed by the concept of "the principles of fundamental justice". Thus, the court held that a contravention of s. 7 of the Charter may result if the combination of the direct indictment with the failure of the Crown to make adequate disclosure results in the inability of the accused to make full answer and defence at his trial."

Stinchcombe v. The Queen supra

"It is difficult to justify the position which clings to the notion that the Crown has no legal duty to disclose all relevant information. The arguments against the existence of such a duty are groundless while those in favour, are, in my view overwhelming."

"I would add that the fruits of the investigation which are in the possession of counsel for the Crown are not the property of the Crown for use in securing a conviction but the property of the public to be used to ensure that justice is done."

"In the Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr., Prosecution, vol. 1: Findings and Recommendations (1989) (the "Marshall Commission Report"), the commissioners found that prior inconsistent statements were not disclosed to the defence. This was an important contributing factor in the miscarriage of justice which occurred and led the commission to state that "anything less than complete disclosure by the Crown falls short of decency and fair play" (vol. 1 at p. 238).

"…much leeway must be accorded to the exercise of the discretion of the counsel for the Crown with respect to the manner and timing of the disclosure, the absolute withholding of information which is relevant to the defence can only be justified on the basis of the existence of a legal privilege which excludes the information from disclosure."

"…all relevant information must be disclosed subject to the reviewable discretion of the Crown. The material must include not only that which the Crown intends to introduce into evidence but also that which it does not. No distinction should be made between inculpatory and exculpatory evidence."

R. v. V.(W.J.) (May 1992), 72 C.C.C. (3d) 97,

"The purpose of disclosure is to enable an accused person to make full answer and defence. If the disclosure is to be meaningful, it is incumbent upon Crown counsel to procure from the police all relevant materials gleaned from the investigation and, within his or her reviewable discretion, to disclose the results to defence counsel."

"The duty rests upon Crown counsel to obtain from the police all material that should be properly disclosed to defence counsel".

Boucher v. The Queen (1954), 110 C.C.C. 263,

"It cannot be over-emphasized that the purpose of a criminal prosecution is not to obtain a conviction; it is to lay before a jury what the Crown considers to be credible evidence relevant to what is alleged to be a crime. Counsel have a duty to see that all available legal proof of the facts is presented; it should be done firmly and pressed to its legitimate strength, but it must also be done fairly. The role of prosecutor excludes any notion of winning or losing; his function is a matter of public duty than which in civil life there can be none charged with greater personal responsibility. It is to be efficiently performed with an ingrained sense of the dignity, the seriousness and the justness of judicial proceedings".

R. v. Peavoy (1974), 15 C.C.C. (2d) 97,

"A person swearing an information, particularly a law enforcement officer, is not at liberty to swear the information in a perfunctory or irresponsible manner with a reckless disregard as to the truth of his assertion."

"If it should transpire that the person swearing the information has done so falsely or has misled the Justice of the Peace, then he risks the possibility of both criminal and civil proceedings against him personally for his misconduct".

R. v. Whitmore (1987), 41 C.C.C. (3d) 555,

"The laying of a false information obviously can found an action for malicious prosecution: Casey v. Automobiles Renault Canada Ltd., (1964) 2 C.C.C. 289".

Nelles v. Ontario (1989), 60 D.L.R. (4th) 609,

"Prosecutorial immunity is a question of policy. Absolute immunity for the Attorney-General and his agents, the Crown Attorneys, is not justified in the interests of public policy. An absolute immunity has the effect of negating a private right of action and in some case may bar a remedy under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. As such, the existence of absolute immunity is a threat to the individual rights of citizens who have been wrongly and maliciously prosecuted. The considerations in favour of absolute immunity have some merit but these considerations must give way to the right of a private citizen to seek a remedy when the prosecutor acts maliciously in fraud of his duties with the result that he causes damage to the victim. The inherent difficulty in proving a case of malicious prosecution combined with the mechanisms available within the system of civil procedure to weed out meritless claims is sufficient to ensure that the Attorney-General and Crown Attorneys will not be hindered in the proper execution of their important public duties".

"A ruling on a preliminary motion to the effect that Attorneys-General and their agents are absolutely immune from all liability for suits for malicious prosecution may be too expansive and even ill-founded".

Re Cunliffe and Law Society of B.C. (1984), 13 C.C.C. (3d) 560,

"In dismissing the appeal of Mr. Bledsoe the court held that Mr. Bledsoe had failed in his duty to advise counsel for the accused in a timely manner of the existence of the additional Thursday witnesses once he learned of counsel for the accused's ignorance of such witnesses. Upon becoming aware that counsel for the accused was ignorant of such witnesses he postponed performing his duty and the mistrial then intervened. He had failed to instruct his successor, Mr. Cunliffe, who could have remedied that breach. Mr. Bledsoe's failure could not be described as a mere oversight or excused because of inexperience".

"I would dismiss the appeal of Mr. Bledsoe and allow the appeal of Mr. Cunliffe".

Canadian Criminal Code, s. 603;

"An accused is entitled, after he has been ordered to stand trial or at his trial, (a) to inspect without charge the indictment, his own statement, the evidence and the exhibits, if any; and (b) to receive, on payment of a reasonable fee determined in accordance with a tariff of fees fixed or approved by the Attorney General of the province, a copy (i) of the evidence,".

Canadian Criminal Code, s. 650 (3);

"An accused in entitled, after the close of the case for the prosecution, to make full answer and defence personally or by counsel. R. S., c. C-34, s. 577; 1972, c. 13 s. 50; 1991, c. 43, s. 9".

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 7;

" Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice."

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 11 (d);

"Any person charged with an offence has the right (d) to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal;"

Calvert et al. v. Law Society of Upper Canada (1981), 32 O.R. (2d) 176,

"If the Benchers are aware of allegations of lack of good character on the part of an applicant that they consider serious enough to be considered, then I am of the opinion that there is a duty upon them to investigate them. In the absence of any such allegations, I am of the opinion that an applicant is entitled to be deemed to be of good character".

"…if it should be that the Benchers found Pearson to be of bad character but still admitted him to practice, they may have been negligent or lacked bona fides".

"…there is a duty owed to the plaintiffs by the Law Society for its negligence in not properly undertaking its function of investigating complaints and making a decision or in failing to exercise such duty to the public and to these plaintiffs in a bona fide manner".

The Canadian Bar Association's Code of Professional Conduct at page 35, 36 and 37:

Rules

Prohibited Conduct

2. "The lawyer must not, for example:

(e) Knowingly attempt to deceive or participate in the deception of a tribunal or influence the course of justice by offering false evidence, misstating facts or law, presenting or relying upon a false or deceptive affidavit, suppressing what ought to be disclosed or otherwise assisting in any fraud, crime or illegal conduct".

Errors and Omissions

3. "The lawyer who has unknowingly done or failed to do something that, if done or omitted knowingly, would have been in breach of this Rule and discovers it, has a duty to the court, subject to the Rule relating to confidential information, to disclose the error or omission and do all that can reasonably be done in the circumstances to rectify it".

Duties of prosecutor

9. "When engaged as a prosecutor, the lawyer's prime duty is not to seek a conviction, but to present before the trial court all available credible evidence relevant to the alleged crime in order that justice may be done through a fair trial upon the merits. The prosecutor exercises a public function involving much discretion and power and must act fairly and dispassionately. The prosecutor should not do anything that might prevent the accused from being represented by counsel or communicating with counsel and, to the extent required by law and accepted practice, should make timely disclosure to the accused or defence counsel (or to the court if the accused in not represented) of all relevant facts and known witnesses, whether tending to show guilt or innocence, or that would affect the punishment of the accused."

Legal Profession Act

Part 1

Organization and Duties

Public interest

3. It is the object and duty of the society

(a) to uphold and protect the public interest in the administration of justice by

(i) preserving and protecting the rights and freedoms of all persons,

(ii) ensuring the independence, integrity and honour of its members,

and

(iii) establishing standards for the education, professional responsibility and competence of its members and applicants for membership

Court of Appeal for British Columbia, Regina v. Derik Christopher Lord ( page10 ), Mr. Justice Wood stated, " But this case is somewhat unusual. The Crown's case stood or fell on the evidence of Amanda Cousins. Either the jury believed her or they did not. ..... The jury clearly accepted the evidence of Amanda Cousins. ...... In that event it is inconceivable that their verdict could or would have been any different if the proper instructions had been given to them on the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule.".

R. v. Charbonneau (1992), 74 C.C.C. (3d) 49,

"In my view, the Crown has a duty to disclose all relevant information in its possession, and the trial judge has a broad discretion, at common law, to order disclosure of any relevant statement required to enable the accused to make full answer and defence and to assure a fair trial."

R .v. Pearson (February 1994), 89 C.C.C. (3d) 535,

"Disclosure should be made upon request, even if the information to be divulged is relevant primarily or exclusively to issues like entrapment or insanity, which are in principle dealt with only if …. Even in the absence of a request, information that might be helpful should be disclosed at the first reasonable opportunity."

R v. Johnson (March 1994), 89 C.C.C. (3d) 90,

"Mr. Mulligan urges on us that defence counsel have a duty to conduct reasonable inquiries and investigations themselves. He says an accused person ought not to be heard to complain of non-disclosure where partial disclosure has been made from which it would be apparent to defence counsel that there may be further material in the hands of the Crown which had inadvertently been omitted from disclosure, and counsel makes no inquiry of the Crown".

"We agree with that submission to this extent. If a court were of the view that defence counsel must have known that there had been an inadvertent disclosure omission, and had deliberately abstained from making inquiry of the Crown, the court might be justified in rejecting an application thereafter for Charter relief based on that omission. We do not agree that the defence in this case had an obligation to find out by independent inquiry that which the Crown ought to have disclosed to it but had not. Nor could defence counsel have been expected to inquire of the Crown….".

R v. Farinacci (1994), 88 C.C.C. (3d) 1,

"The Charter guarantee to make full answer and defence requires that, as a general rule, all relevant information in the possession of the state be disclosed to an accused. In order to justify non-disclosure the Crown must bring itself within an exception to that general rule".

"… non-disclosure can only be justified on the basis that disclosure will prejudice the interests of informants, innocent persons or the law enforcement authorities and that such prejudice overbears the interests of the accused".

"The appellants should not be required to demonstrate the specific use to which they might put information which they have not ever seen. The respondent (Crown) has not been able to satisfy me that no prejudice occurred and an appellate court which does not have the benefit of access to counsel's brief cannot be expected to speculate in the circumstances. I must conclude, therefore, that the ability of the appellants to make full answer and defence was compromised".

"The fact that the trial judge may not have seen how the excised material could have assisted the appellants does not necessarily mean that defence counsel would not have found a way to use that material to their advantage".

R. v. Durette, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 469, 1993:  November 10; 1994:  March 17.

Per Lamer C.J. and Sopinka, Cory and Major JJ.: The Charter guarantee of the right to make full answer and defence requires that, as a general rule, all relevant information in the possession of the state be disclosed to an accused. The accused should not be required to demonstrate the specific use to which they might put information which they have not even seen.

S. v. Recorder of Manchester (H.L.), (1970) 2 W.L.R. 21, Lord Morris , page 37;

"The desire of any Court must be to ensure, so far as possible, that only those are punished who are in fact guilty. The duty of a Court to clear the innocent must be equal or superior in importance to its duty to convict and punish the guilty."

Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr., Prosecution (1989)

"This decision of most American States to codify disclosure requirements is a good one. The approach reflected in current case law involves assessing each individual case of real or alleged non-disclosure to determine if it actually impairs the accused's constitutional right to make full answer and defence. We believe that such an ad hoc approach to disclosure means uncertainty and possible unfairness. The inability of an accused to adequately prepare a defence threatens the fairness of the criminal justice system, and it is desirable that as much discretion and subjectivity as possible to removed from decisions concerning disclosure. The fundamental interest in a fair trial of the accused requires that the accused receive from the Crown all information known to the Crown that might reasonably be considered useful to the accused. The Crown should have a positive and continuing duty to provide this information to the defence. It is immaterial whether or not defence counsel fails to request disclosure of the information in possession of the Crown, or indeed whether defence counsel is negligent in failing to do so. The circumstances of non-disclosure should not be permitted to affect adversely the fairness of the trial received by the accused. The focal point of the issue of fairness is the fact of disclosure of material evidence.".

The New Zealand Law Commission, Report No. 14, Criminal Procedure: Part One , Disclosure and Committal (1990)

"There is the further important advantage of increased public confidence in verdicts of guilt where both sides have been able to make suitable preparation and with little chance that any significant fact has been kept from the defence.".

In October 1981, the then Attorney General of Ontario tabled in the Legislature a set of guidelines to Crown prosecutors respecting disclosure in criminal cases. The Honourable Mr. Justice Zuber, in his 1987 Report of the Ontario Courts Inquiry, recommended that the guidelines be upgraded to a directive. On October 1, 1989, the previous guidelines were upgraded to a directive, which remains in force today in Ontario.
 

Summary of evidence

1.  Selective wire-taps were released, not all.

2.  Selective witness statements were provided. ( Charles Smith's statement wasn't provided
        until after Darren Huenemann's trial, eight months after it was taken. )

3.  Evidence was hidden:
                    a)  Video tape.
                    b)  Police notes.
                    c)  Phone records from the Ferry.
                    d)  What equipment Cst. Black used and what he produced with it.

4.  Evidence not acted upon:
                    a)  Hair found at the crime scene.
                    b)  Paint found in the wounds.

5.  Evidence manipulated:
                    a)  Identification statements were never supported with identification in court by
                        the individuals
                    b)  Darren Huenemann ( a convicted murderer ) was called to the stand
                        when the court was told he would refuse to co-operate.
                    c)  Witness coerced until he refused to co-operate ( Charles Smith )
 
 
 

Evidence in detail

1.Mr. Madigan did not deny, according to his answering letter to the Law Society, that evidencewas kept from the Defence. His defence is the fact that Derik's Defence did not ask for specific items of evidence or specific evidence of witnesses. This ridiculous statement presumes that the defence counsel had extra sensory perception or some secret source in the police department that was feeding information about the investigation to the accused. Of course none of this existed, and all the defence counsel could do was ask the Crown for all the evidence that had been collected by the police and others ( crime lab, etc. ) involved with the investigation. Peter Firestone, Derik's defence counsel, made repeated requests for full disclosure before the trial. He was assured over and over that he had all the evidence the Crown had. We have since discovered this was a lie.

2. The Minister of Justice has started an investigation into my son's case after I presented an application under section 690 of the Criminal code of Canada. Mr. Allan Ferguson, from the office of Criminal Convictions Review Group, on April 18, 1996, during a interrogation of my daughter, Dawn, revealed the fact that even more information was withheld by the Delta police. He produced a wiretap tape that contained my daughter in conversation with a friend in which she states she saw her brother Derik at 8:30 pm, a time inconsistent with the police story. Susan Beach, co-defence council for Derik Lord, attended this interrogation and confirmed this evidence was not disclosed to the defence.

3. The Crown prosecutor stated that there was no physical evidence to convict the boys. However he never revealed to the defense that there was indeed physical evidence. This physical evidence pointed away from Derik and David or at the least could have been used by the defense to point out reasonable doubt. Mr. Justice Wood of the B. C. Appeal Court stated, "The Crown's case stood or fell on the evidence of Amanda Cousins." This statement displays the fact that the Crown did not use the physical evidence available and did not disclose it to the defense for their use.

The only conclusion one can come to is that this crowbar and the one referred to in the trial transcript as being purchased from Capital Iron were examined and the paint did not match exhibit 26. This is proof the police and the lab were wrong as to where this paint came from. The fact is this paint is primarily used mainly on wood and almost exclusively on wood from the orient. Our private detective discovered the above facts from Chemcraft Sadolin (B.C.) Ltd. (paint manufacturer). What happened to this paint? Was it ever tested to see if it matched the paint found in Mrs. Leatherbarrow's skull? 4. The defense was never informed as to where exhibit 32A, 32B, 35, and 36 came from. Presumably these exhibits came from Mrs. Huenemann and Mrs. Leatherbarrow, as they are referred in the lab report as " known scalp hair samples .... known pubic hair samples". Presumably exhibit 74, 78, 80, and 81 came from the crime scene. The defense was never told where any of these exhibits came from. The defense was never given a list of exhibits from the crime scene or the laboratory. If my assumption is correct and the known exhibits are from Mrs. Huenemann and Mrs. Leatherbarrow, and the lab tells us that the exhibits 74, 78, 80 and 81 do not match, then these exhibits come from a stranger. Maybe the murderer. Why didn't the police obtain samples from Derik Lord and David Muir and test their hair with the exhibits. Was there any material with these hairs that could be used for DNA tests? Maybe the known samples are from Derik Lord and David Muir and they didn't match. The above remains a Crown secret. The above information, again if my presumptions are correct, is further doubt that Derik was ever at this crime scene. The above information, if my presumptions are correct, is further evidence that was never followed up on. If Derik was to have murdered these women, then why was his hair never compared to the unidentified hairs found at the crime scene? Were the hairs Exhibits 28 and 29 ( questioned hair ) ever compared to the hairs, Exhibits 74, 78, 80, or 81? Did all these hairs come from the same individual? Was a chemical analysis ever done on these hairs and if not why not? This analysis could have for example, determined drug abuse by the individual whose hair it was. Why were the clothes compared to fibre found at the crime scene but Derik Lord and David Muir's hair was never compared to the hair found at the crime scene?

5. There was a hole measuring 3.5 centimeters in Mrs. Leatherbarrow's skull. Today's technology can determine the force needed to break any material. Why were there no tests done to determine the force needed to make this 3.5 centimeter hole? These tests would have determined if a 17 year old with a 17 inch crowbar could have the strength to produce this damage. Tests of the blows to the heads could have determined approximately how tall the murderer was. If these tests were done, the defense was never told. All of the above information is physical evidence which indicates reasonable doubt that Derik Lord and David Muir were ever at the crime scene.

6. Detective Jackson stated under oath that he told Derik only one person killed both women.

How did the police know that only one person committed the murders? Did they do tests on the hair and other physical evidence to determine that only one murderer did this horrible crime? Where is the evidence that was collected and indicated what this officer told Derik is true? Why are two young men serving a life sentence when Detective Jackson said there was only one murderer?

7. The prosecution withheld from the defense council any evidence produced by the RCMP officers who attended the crime scene, including any notes and results of the work they performed. We hired a private detective who discovered that the RCMP officers produced a video tape of the scene, a blood splatter analysis, and used a "LUMA" light. This was confirmed by one of the officers who did the work. When asked what happened to it the officer said they sent it to the Delta police. This work could hardly be considered by the police and the prosecution to be irrelevant. The only information the defense received about the work and equipment these officers used and produced was from the log by the first police officers on the crime scene. " 0744 hrs Sgt. LEROY returns to back yard with equipment". The Delta police refused to deal with us but did deny ever receiving this material from the RCMP. We have a letter from the Delta police telling us we would not be allowed to speak to any Delta police officer until the very last appeal is over. Why? What is the Crown hiding?

8. The defense was not made aware of what the exhibit was that RCMP Sgt. Leroy took from the carport during his investigation of the scene. The only reference the defense got was in the police log "11:54 hours: Sgt. LEROY brings out exhibit from carport." This was more physical evidence.

9. The defense was never told what equipment was used and for what purpose by Cst. Black.

10. Cst. Black was at the crime scene from 03:57 hours to 09:52 hours. He returned at 11:00 hours and according to the log never left again until the log at the crime scene was ended at 15:21 hours. What did Cst. Black produce in more than 10 hours at the crime scene with all the equipment he carried in? I hardly think Delta police attend crime scenes with equipment and then do nothing relevant with this equipment.

All the above physical evidence completely contradicts what the prosecution said in court about the fact that there was no physical evidence. We must agree that there was no physical evidence that indicated Derik Lord or David Muir did this crime. However there is plenty of physical evidence that raises doubt that Derik and David were ever at the crime scene. The prosecution presented their entire case on hearsay evidence. The prosecution, along with the police, withheld from the defense substantial evidence that when combined presents an overwhelming indication of reasonable doubt.

11. As the evidence indicates there is little disputing the fact that a phone call was placed to the Huenemann residence by David Muir at about 8:00 p.m. The police know that all long distance phone calls times and numbers are recorded. The call, if the police are correct, must have been made from the ferry as it left Tsawwassen at 7:30 p.m. and never arrived at Swartz Bay until about 9:00 p.m. This, then, was a long distance call and therefore the time and number must have been recorded. The police never accessed the telephone records or, if they did, they did not inform the defense of the results. Our private detective attempted to access these records and was told they had disappeared for the day in question.

12. Police made numerous accusations. About the motive, Amanda and they said Derik was to receive a house in Sooke as payment for these murders ( Statement of Amanda Cousins, November 28, 1990 at 22:30 hours, page 2 ). They never brought anyone in to confirm that indeed a real estate person had shown a house to two teenage boys, Darren and Derik. They said crowbars were used as weapons, yet the crowbars they purchased did not match the paint left in Mrs. Leatherbarrow's skull. They said that the boys were to have dropped the crowbars over the side of the ferry on the way back, yet they never produced a single witness, other than the hearsay evidence of Amanda Cousins, who said they saw them throw something from the ferry. The only witness that said she saw Derik on the 7:00 p.m. ferry never spoke to him. She only reported recognizing him, even though she hadn't seen Derik in more than eighteen months.

13. This case has been extremely frustrating for the defense. The police did not tape record Amanda Cousins' statements, they did not tape record David Muir's statement, they did not tape record their conversation with David Muir on November 22, 1990, they did not tape record their conversation with Derik Lord on November 25, 1990 and they did not tape record various conversations which could be used by the defense. Their equipment did not work when it was convenient for it to fail. eg. Trial transcript page 802, 803, " we had problems with the bug and we weren't able to record any of that information.".

14. Darren Hunemann's lawyer Chris Considine was forced to sign an undertaking not to releasecertain information he received from the prosecution. Not to even reveal it to the other defense lawyers. As far as we know this information was never released to Derik's defense lawyer.

15. The police continually lied to all concerned.

This is a far cry from positive id. The fact is that David Muir was 16 years old and Derik Lord was 17, not in their mid 20's. The above comprises the police positive identification of Derik and David. The trial judge confirms the above at transcripts page 905, " You will recall no identification was made by any of them in the courtroom. The only identification documents put to Mr. Bhinder or Danny May being their respective ballots with their notations on it of "rings a bell", "sort of looks like" and the numbers they designated. Earlier evidence identified the numbers 2 and 8 as being the two accused.".

16. Next door neighbor, Charles Smith, in a statement taken at 9:45 a.m., October 6, 1990, said hesaw one of the women, he assumed to be Mrs. Huenemann because she had glasses on, in the passenger side of the car in the drive way at 8:00 to 8:30 p.m. In his statement he stated that the dome light coming on in the car drew his attention to the fact someone was in the passenger side of the car with the door open. He also stated that when the light went out he could not see anything any more. On page 383 of the trial transcript the trial judge states in defense of the police and their failure to disclose relevant information to the judge who granted the wiretap order, " The evidence of Charles Smith was explained by the corporal as being suspect as to accuracy.". Mr. Smith may not have been accurate as to the exact time but he was very emphatic that it was definitely dark out, it is very hard to be mistaken as to whether it was light or dark outside. It was dark outside.

According to the Boundary Bay Airport control tower, approximately 8 kilometers from the murder scene, sunset on October 5, 1990 was 18:40 o'clock ( 6:40 p.m. ) and aviation down time for pilots without night endorsements was 19:14 o'clock ( 7:14 p.m. ). The Vancouver Sun news paper has the sun set time as 6:43 p.m. for October 5, 1990. Vancouver official Environment Canada weather report for 7:00 p.m. October 5, 1990 (02:00 o'clock, October 6, 1990, Greenwich Mean Time) was scattered cloud at 4000 and 6000 feet with a visibility of 30 miles and a temperature of 22.5 degrees Celsius. At 8:00 p.m. Mr. Smith would have clearly been able to see the light in the caddy come on. This definitely makes the time after 7:00 p.m. as it is quite light out at this time. Police visited him a year later and suggested he was mistaken, it must have been 6:00 p.m. Mr. Smith then changed his story. I have spoken to Mr. Smith and he is now definite that it was 6:00 to 6:30 p.m. despite the fact that it is still daylight at this time on October 5. Since Mr. Smith was intimidated by the police to change his story, I wonder how much intimidation it would take to make a 17 year old ( Amanda Cousins ) change her story? The police made sure that Mr. Smith was a witness that the defense could not use.

17. The entire prosecution of this case was based on lies, deceit, and intimidation of witnesses, both by the police and the prosecutor. The prosecutor deceived the jury when he called the May boys and the taxi drivers to give their testimony. It was noted by the judge that none of these witnesses who were identified by the police as providing positive identification were asked to identify the defendants in court. This deliberate deceit by the prosecutor left the jury with the belief that positive identification was made because of their statements. In fact positive identification was never made inside or outside court.

18. Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall Jr. Prosecution

A summary of the Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall Jr. Prosecution. It virtually mirrors my son's case. I include some of the summary findings from the Royal Commission with some comparison to Derik's case.

When you decide to disbar Mr. Madigan, you are not setting precedence. The Discipline Committee of the Benchers of the Law Society of British Columbia found Mr. Richard Carrol Bledsoe and Mr. Donald Moore Cunliffe guilty of conduct unbecoming a member of the Law Society for not disclosing evidence to the defence in a murder trial. The appeal court of B.C. in Re Cuncliffe and Law Society of British Columbia, Re Bledsoe and Law Society of British Columbia, Supra, found the Benchers correct in regards to Mr. Bledsoe but allowed the appeal of Mr. Cunliffe as he was not party to the deliberate deception of the defence.

You have the ability, the legal responsibility, the public interest, the necessity to prevent justice being brought further into disrepute, and you now have the information that Mr. Sean Madigan is not qualified to practice law as he lacks a conscience, morals and bona fides to practice law in British Columbia. You must disbar this man before he is allowed to destroy more lives because of his ignorance of the law. You must demand that this man attempt to amend his violation of the laws of disclosure and contact the courts and the provincial Attorney General and the federal Minister of Justice to rectify his abuses and live up to the Canadian Bar Association's Code of Professional Conduct; Errors and Omissions